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In spite of substantial growth in agricultural GDP in the 1990s, rural poverty rates 
in Pakistan did not decline.  This paper explores the reasons for this lack of correlation 
between increases in agricultural production and poverty reduction through an analysis of 
growth linkages using a 2001-02 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)-based semi-input-
output model.  Model simulations indicate that expansion of traditional crop agriculture 
can significantly benefit rural poor farmers.  However, because of skewed distribution of 
land and earnings from land, landless agricultural labourers and the rural non-farm poor 
(who, together, account for 61 percent of the rural poor) do not benefit directly from 
growth in the crop sector.  In the absence of a change in the structure of rural incomes 
and employment, further measures will likely be needed for rapid poverty reduction in 
Pakistan, including greater efforts to boost the livestock sector, expansion of the rural 
non-farm economy (in addition to agricultural growth-induced linkage effects), and 
targeted interventions to the poorest rural households.       
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies have shown a link between agricultural productivity growth 
and poverty reduction through reductions in food prices and growth in employment in 
both the agricultural and the rural non-agricultural sectors [Ahluwalia (1978); Mellor 
(1976, 1978); Hazell and Ramasamy (1991)].  Moreover, econometric evidence 
suggests that agricultural growth is more effective in reducing rural poverty than is 
industrial growth, though this relationship may not hold when ownership of land is 
highly skewed [Datt and Ravallion (1998); Timmer (1997) and Thirtle (2001)].  
The experience of Pakistan in the 1980s fits this general pattern, as steady 
growth in agricultural GDP coincided with significant declines in rural poverty.  
However, in spite of substantial growth in agricultural GDP in the 1990s, rural 
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poverty rates did not decline over the decade as a whole.  This disconnect between 
agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction raises several questions: Why did 
rural poverty not decline in the 1990s? Are growth multiplier effects on rural non-
agricultural employment and income no longer important? How much can changes in 
agricultural production as a result of changes in land tenure, access to credit, and 
access to water be expected to raise incomes of the rural poor? And finally, what are 
the implications for the rural development strategy?  
This paper explores these issues, focusing on the structure of rural household 
incomes as captured in an analysis of the impacts of agricultural growth linkages.  
Section II discusses historical patterns of agricultural growth and the structure of 
household incomes.  Section III describes the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)- 
based semi-input-output model used in the analysis.  Model simulations results of the 
impacts of increased agricultural production and selected reforms in land tenure and 
farmer credit are covered in Section IV. Section V presents conclusions and 
implications for rural poverty reduction strategies.   
 
II. THE AGRICULTURAL GROWTH—RURAL POVERTY  
PARADOX OF THE 1990S 
Pakistan’s agricultural sector has enjoyed steady growth for most of the last 
three decades, with agricultural GDP increasing by an average of 4.1 percent per 
year from 1975 to 2000.  Green revolution technology of improved seeds, irrigation, 
and increased fertiliser use spurred rapid growth in crop agriculture (especially wheat 
and rice) beginning in the later 1960s.  Livestock production outpaced the rapid 
growth in crop agriculture, with value-added increasing by 5.3 percent per year from 
1975 to 2000.   
Average real agricultural GDP growth was 3.9 percent per year during this 
period, (3.2 percent for crops).  Rural poverty (headcount) declined steadily from 
49.3 percent in 1984-85 to 36.9 percent in 1990-91 to 33.4 percent in 1993-94.  
Similarly, the poverty gap declined from 11.9 percent in 1984-85 to 7.8 percent in 
1990-91 to 6.4 percent in 1993-94 (Table 1).   
 
Table 1 
Poverty Estimates for Pakistan 
 1984-85 1987-88 1990-91 1993-94 1998-99 2001-02 
Urban 38.2 30.7 28.0 17.2 24.2 22.7 
Rural 49.3 40.2 36.9 33.4 35.9 38.9 
Overall 46.0 37.4 34.0 28.6 32.6 32.1 
Source: World Bank (2002), p. 20. For 2001-02, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 
(2002-03). 
Note: 1998-99 data from PIHS; all other years’ HIES, PIHS, and HIES combined since 1998-99. 
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For the decade of the 1990s overall, however, rural poverty rates stagnated in 
spite of continued agricultural growth.  Real agricultural GDP rose by 4.6 percent per 
annum, yet the percentage of rural poor living below the poverty line remained 
essentially unchanged between 1990-91 (36.9 percent) and 1998-99 (35.9 percent), 
and even rose to 38.9 percent in 2001-02, a drought year.1   
With substantial growth in agricultural earnings, what explains the lack of 
progress in reducing rural poverty in the 1990s? Part of the explanation for the 
paradox is that agricultural growth rates appear to have been overstated because of 
an upward adjustment to livestock population numbers used in the 1995-96 national 
accounts estimates that was not used to revise livestock value-added in the previous 
years.  Adjusting for this change in the base estimates of livestock reduces per capita 
real agricultural GDP growth in the 1990s from 4.5 percent to 3.1 percent per capita 
(from 2.0 to 0.6 percent, in per capita terms) [Malik (2003)].   
A second factor is an increase in the real consumer prices of major staples since 
the mid-1990s.  Real prices of wheat, wheat flour, and basmati rice fell steadily from the 
late 1970s to the early 1990s, raising real incomes of net food purchasers.  For example, 
real whole grain wheat prices fell by 21 percent between 1975–79 and 1990–94; real 
wheat flour prices fell by 10 percent in the same period.  After 1996, however, real prices 
of these commodities rose, so that real wheat and wheat flour prices in 2000–03 averaged 
14 and 11 percent higher, respectively, than in 1990–04. (Figure 1)      
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1Survey evidence suggests that incomes and the level of poverty (headcount) vary substantially 
across regions of Pakistan, though problems of sample size and sample design prevent definitive 
conclusions.  World Bank (2002) reports rural poverty headcounts for 1998-99 that vary little between 
Punjab (34.7 percent) and Sindh (37.1 percent), but are higher in the NWFP (46.5 percent).   
 Wheat Wheat flr. Commod.
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Structure of Household Incomes 
Slow actual overall agricultural growth and a rise in the prices of major 
staples may be sufficient to explain the low correlation between agricultural growth 
and rural poverty reduction in Pakistan in the 1990s.  In addition, the skewed 
structure of ownership and access to factors of production in rural Pakistan, which 
are in part due to distortions in factor markets, may also have contributed to the 
disconnect between agricultural growth and poverty reduction in the 1990s.  
Moreover, these structural factors have important implications for future efforts to 
reduce rural poverty.  
Based on a poverty line of 734 Rs/person/month and the Pakistan HIES 2001-
02 data, more than 60 percent of rural poor households are not farm households 
(Table 2).  Rural non-farm households account for 46 percent of the rural poor; 
agricultural labourer households comprise 15 percent of the rural poor. Though there 
is substantial poverty among small landowning farmers (38 percent are poor), this 
group accounts for only 24 percent of the total rural poor households.  Landless 
tenant farmers (61 percent of whom are poor) account for another 13 percent of the 
rural poor.  
 
Table 2 












% of Total 
Rural Poor 
Medium and Large Farmers 0.59 24.1% 0.14 2.3% 
Small Farmers 3.83 38.3% 1.47 23.7% 
Landless Farmers 1.33 60.5% 0.81 13.0% 
Rural Agric. Labourers 1.32 69.0% 0.91 14.7% 
Rural Non-farm Non-poor 3.33 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 
Rural Non-farm Poor 2.87 100.0% 2.87 46.3% 
Total Rural 13.27 46.7% 6.20 100.0% 
Source: Based on a poverty line of 734 Rs/person/month and the HIES 2001-02. 
 
HIES (2001-02) data on rural incomes also highlight the importance of the 
rural non-farm economy and labour income for the poor (Figure 2).  Crop income 
(own-farm) accounted for only 23 of household income, and only 18 percent of 
income for the poorest 20 percent of households.  Livestock accounted for 14 percent 
of total rural household incomes, with little variation across expenditure quintiles.  
Thus, agricultural farm income was only 37 percent of the total rural incomes.  
Wages and salaries accounted for 26 percent of the total reported rural household  
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income across all rural households; for the poorest two quintiles, the labour 
income shares were 37 and 34 percent, respectively.  Foreign remittances accounted 
for 6 percent of incomes of the top expenditure quintile, but only 0.5 percent of 
incomes of the poorest quintile.  
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Compared with the national accounts data, however, total household 
expenditures and incomes in the HIES are substantially understated.  Total annual 
private per capita consumption in the HIES data is only Rs 11,400, 62 percent of the 
national accounts figure (Rs 18,500).  In order to obtain an estimate of the level and 
structure of household incomes that was more consistent with agricultural production 
and national accounts data, a social accounting matrix (SAM) was constructed using 
data from these and other secondary sources (see Appendix 1).  The results suggest 
that farm incomes are even more highly skewed than indicated in the HIES or the 
PRHS, and that the importance of non-farm incomes in total rural household incomes 
is generally understated in the household survey data.   
Based on data from the Agricultural Census, Agricultural Prices Commission 
Cost of Production, national accounts, and MINFAL (Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Livestock) the estimates from the SAM indicate that returns to land account for 55 
percent of value-added in crop production and 27 percent of total agricultural income 
(including livestock, fishing, and forestry).  Returns to operated land on medium and 
large farms alone account for 21 percent of total crop value-added.  Total returns to 
labour are 27 percent of the value-added in the crop sector, but the share of hired 
labour in the sector value-added is only 5 percent.   
      Other income 
       Gifts, transfers, pensions 
      Wages and Salaries 
      Livestock 
      Crop production 
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Given this large share of land incomes in agricultural value-added and the 
skewed distribution of land, medium and large land owners (those with 12.5 acres or 
more), who account for 10 percent of agricultural households, receive an estimated 
32 percent of agricultural incomes.   
However, agricultural incomes (including livestock) generally account for 
only 56 percent of total incomes for agricultural households (41 percent of total 
population in Pakistan).  Including rural non-agricultural households (31 percent of 
national population), the share of agricultural incomes in total rural incomes is only 
37 percent. Thus, incomes from rural non-agricultural activities, including 
processing and trade of agricultural products, small industry, construction, and 
general trade and transport services account for 63 percent of total rural incomes, and 






















Medium and Large Farms 15.7 83.5 29.9 57.2 
Small Farms 6.1 67.9 8.6 54.8 
Landless Farmers 7.2 87.7 5.3 59.7 
Rural Agric. Workers 2.2 53.1 5.5 53.1 
Rural Non-farm Non-poor 0.3 1.9 0.1 0.4 
Rural Non-farm Poor 0.2 6.3 0.2 4.5 
Total Rural 6.1 69.7 5.6 37.2 
Rural Agric. Households 7.1 74.8 9.6 55.9 
Source: Pakistan SAM 2001-02; PIDE/World Bank (2002).   
 
The contribution of agricultural growth to increased rural incomes is not 
limited to farm incomes, however.  Increases in agricultural production generally 
involve increased demand for agricultural inputs, processing, and marketing services.  
Also, as household incomes rise, consumer demand for both urban and rural products 
and services increases.  To the extent that the supply of goods and services is elastic, 
these increases in demand can spur increases in production and further increases in 
demand.  
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III.  THE SAM-BASED SEMI-INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL 
This analysis of growth linkages in Pakistan uses a variant of the fixed-price, 
linear input-output (IO) model, the semi-input-output (SIO) model.2  The SIO model 
uses fixed coefficients to simulate inter-industry production and consumption 
linkages, assuming fixed prices in all sectors. To simulate real-world supply 
rigidities, the model disaggregates sectors into those which are either supply-
constrained (Z1) or perfectly elastic in supply (Z2) [Bell and Hazell (1980)].  In 
supply-constrained sectors (Z1), firms operate at full capacity, and output cannot 
increase without additional capital investment or introduction of new, more 
productive technology.   
Total supply in each sector (Z) is modelled as the sum of inter-industry input 
demand (AZ) and final demand (F), where final demand includes consumption by 
households (βY) and exogenous sources of demand such as exports (E).  Income (Y) 
is related to production through a fixed value-added share (v) in gross commodity 
output (Z), (Equation 1).   
As indicated in Equation (2), the SIO model permits output responses only in 
those sectors with excess capacity (Z2).  Perfect substitutability between domestic 
and imports/exports in the supply-constrained sectors (Z1) guarantees that prices are 
fixed for all tradeable goods. Thus, for these models to produce a reasonable 
approximation of reality, the supply-constrained sectors must correspond to tradeable 
goods with fixed domestic supply at the given fixed price, and the perfectly elastic 
sectors must correspond to non-tradeable goods.  In supply-constrained sectors (Z1), 
increases in domestic demand merely reduce net exports (E1), which then become 
endogenous to the system.  
 
E + Zv + ZA = Z





















Investment in additional productive capacity or the introduction of new 
technology will trigger expansion in the production of tradeable goods (Z1) such as 
agricultural cereals, export crops, and manufactures.  Therefore, the key shocks 
initiating growth are those that release production constraints in these tradeable 
sectors.  New investment in productive equipment—induced by government policies 
or incentives—will increase productive capacity of tradeable goods. Public 
 
2This presentation of the SIO model is derived from Dorosh and Haggblade (2003), “Growth 
Linkages, Price Effects and Income Distribution in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Economies, 
12:2.   
… … … … … (1) 
… … … … … (2) 
Dorosh, Niazi, and Nazli 256 
investment in transportation infrastructure or irrigation facilities opens up new 
regions to external markets.  Public investments in agricultural research generate 
new technology that improves productivity of cereals and other tradeable agricultural 
products.   
The specification of which sectors are considered elastic in supply is crucial to 
the SIO model results.  In this Pakistan analysis, the major agricultural traded 
commodities (wheat, IRRI rice, basmati rice, cotton, and sugarcane) are treated as 
inelastically supplied in both their raw and processed forms.  Livestock (cattle and 
other large animals) is also modelled as inelastic in supply, though poultry is 
assumed to be constrained by demand.  Most industrial sectors (mining, vegetable 
oils, leather, chemicals, petroleum refining, other manufacturing, and energy) are 
modelled as inelastic in supply; services are modelled as elastic in supply.  (See Box 
A1). 
Parameters for the model, in general, are derived directly from the SAM.  
However, consumption parameters were adjusted to reflect marginal household 
budget shares and savings rates different from the average shares and savings rates 
reflected in the SAM.3   
 
IV.  MODEL SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
Simulation 1. Output Shocks to Crop and Livestock Agriculture 
The first set of simulations model a 10 percent increase in output of tradable 
crops, together with a 10 percent increase in processing of these activities.4 As 
shown in Table 4, a simultaneous 10 percent increase in wheat, basmati and IRRI 
rice, cotton, and sugarcane production and processing increases incomes of large and 
medium farmers by 7.2 percent, and incomes of small owners and tenants by 4.6 
percent.  Incomes of agricultural workers rise by only 2.9 percent, however, as much 
of the gain in labour incomes accrues to farm-owners and tenants.  Growth linkage 
effects on non-agricultural output result in a 3.3 percent increase in incomes of the 
non-farm rural poor, and a similar increase in the incomes of the non-farm rural non-
poor and the urban poor. 
A 10 percent increase in the output of large livestock has an even greater 
effect, raising overall incomes by 4.5 percent (as compared to 3.1 percent for a 
corresponding increase in output of the major crops).  Due to the distribution of 
livestock assets, the gains for small farmers and landless agricultural households are 
especially large: 9.7 to 10.9 percent.  Combining 10 percent increases in major crops 
and  livestock  raises  national household incomes by an average of 7.6 percent, with  
 
3Specifically, marginal savings rates of households were raised by 0.10, and marginal budget 
shares of manufactured goods, transport, and private services were changed by 0.10, –0.5 and –0.5, 
respectively. 
4Since both the agricultural production and processing activities of these crops are modelled as 
inelastic in supply, it is necessary to exogenously increase both activities in the simulation. 
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gains to the rural non-farm poor (8.2 percent) approximately half the size of gains to 
farm households and agricultural labourers (13.8 to 14.7 percent). Thus, linkage 
effects of agricultural growth on rural non-agricultural incomes are significant, 
though agricultural growth linkages alone are not sufficient to rapidly raise rural 
non-agricultural household incomes.   
Given that agricultural growth was associated with rapid reductions in rural 
poverty in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s, the question arises as to whether 
agricultural growth linkage effects have diminished over time as the structure of the 
Pakistan economy has changed.  In theory, as the rural economy becomes better 
integrated with the urban and international economies, the value-added multipliers 
can decline if the share of non-traded goods produced in rural areas in total rural 
consumption falls.  (For example, rural consumers could increasingly purchase 
urban-produced or imported shoes and clothing, instead of shoes and clothing 
produced in rural areas.)  On the other hand, expansion of the rural non-farm 
economy relative to the farm economy might be expected to raise the value-added 
multiplier for agriculture if the budget share of these commodities in rural incomes 
also rises [See the multiplier model for Egypt by Mellor and Gavian (1999)].   
Simple calculations using an assumed constant multiplier of 1.5 for all 
periods,5 however, suggest that unless the agricultural value-added multiplier has 
increased, the magnitude of the multiplier effects for rural non-farm households may 
have declined sharply.  Over time, the share of major crops in total GDP in Pakistan 
has  fallen  from  0.234  in 1970 to 0.091 in 2000 (Table 5).  As a result, assuming an  
 
Table 5 
Implications of Changes in Economic Structure for Agricultural Multiplier Effects 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 
Agriculture Share of GDP 0.458 0.389 0.306 0.246 0.240 0.232 
Share of Major Crops in GDP 0.231 0.234 0.176 0.130 0.091 0.078 
10% Shock to Agric. (as % of GDP) 4.6% 3.9% 3.1% 2.5% 2.4% 2.3% 
Value-added Multiplier  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 
% Change in Total GDP 11.5% 9.7% 7.6% 6.1% 6.0% 8.1% 
% Change in Non-agriculture 12.7% 9.5% 6.6% 4.9% 4.7% 7.6% 
10% Shock to Major Crops (as % of GDP) 2.3% 2.3% 1.8% 1.3% 0.9% 0.8% 
Value-added Multiplier  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.3 
% Change in Total GDP 5.8% 5.8% 4.4% 3.2% 2.3% 2.7% 
% Change in Non-major Crops 4.5% 4.6% 3.2% 2.2% 1.5% 2.8% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note:  The value-added multiplier is defined as the additional change in value-added generated as divided 
by the value-added of the initial production gain (shock).  The 2002 value-added multiplier is 
derived from the SIO-model simulations; multipliers for all other years are assumed to be equal to 
1.5, based on Hazell and Roell (1983); Mellor (1992), and Mellor and Gavian (1999).  
 
5The multiplier value of 1.5 is the figure used by Hazell and Roell (1983) for Malaysia, by Mellor 
(1992) for a cross-sectional study of Asian countries, and by Mellor and Gavian (1999) for Egypt. 
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unchanged value-added multiplier, the direct effect of a 10 percent gain in major 
crop production is smaller: equivalent to 2.3 percent of GDP in 1970, but only 0.9 
percent of GDP in 2000.  Likewise, the relatively smaller size of the initial shock and 
the larger share of impact of the multiplier effects on the rest of the economy is also 
smaller (4.6 percent of GDP in 1970 as compared with 1.5 percent of GDP in 2000). 
However, if the value-added multiplier has increased substantially over time, 
the impact of agricultural growth on the rural non-farm economy and the rural non-
farm poor need not have diminished to such a large extent.6  Simulated multipliers 
using the 2001-02 SAM SIO model are about 3.3 for major crops and about 1.7 for 
livestock (values which are very high relative to other countries, however, and may 
reflect an overstatement of marketing and processing value-added in Pakistan IO 
table).  Using these multipliers and the shares of agriculture and major crops in GDP 
in 2002 results in estimated effects on the rural non-farm economy similar to those 
using the full SIO model.  Nonetheless, even with a multiplier of 2.5, a 10 percent 
output increase in production of major crops results in only a 2.8 percent gain in 
output of other sectors, about 40 percent less than the estimated change in non-major 
crops assuming a multiplier of 1.5 in 1970.   
The implication is that growth linkage effects have a smaller impact on GDP 
growth and rural poverty reduction today than in 1970, (unless the gains in non-
agricultural incomes go disproportionately to the rural non-farm poor).  Agricultural 
growth still has positive impacts on incomes of the rural poor, but these effects are not 
as large, relative to the size of the economy, as they were three decades ago.  Even 
with agricultural growth of 3.9 percent per year (the historical average from 1975 to 
1990, a rapid period of real agricultural GDP growth) and the higher growth multiplier 
of 2.5, non-agricultural income growth in 2002 would be about 2.9 percent, implying a 
per capita growth rate of less than 1.0 percent per year.7  Similarly, a 3.5 percent 
growth in output of major crops alone in 2002 (equal to the average growth in value-
added from major crops from 1960 to 2002) would lead to a 1.0 percent increase in 
rural non-farm incomes, less than the population growth rate.   
 
6Unfortunately, analyses of the Pakistan economy with a SAM-based semi-input-output model 
from earlier periods have not been done, in large part because of a lack of data.  Earlier analysis by the 
Pakistan Economic Analysis Network (EAN) Project (1989) used 1975-76 and 1984-85 input-output 
tables to calculate demand-driven multipliers in Pakistan agriculture, but this analysis assumed that no 
sectors were constrained in supply, and did not disaggregate households.   
7The value-added multiplier (m) for the agricultural sector as a whole is defined:   
      m = (∆GDP – ∆VAagric ) / ∆VAagric = (∆GDP / ∆VAagric) – 1, 
where ∆VAagric is the change in value-added of the agricultural sector, and ∆GDP is the total change in 
GDP.  Re-arranging the terms, the change in value-added of the non-agricultural sector is: (∆VANA) = m * 
∆VAagric, and the growth rate in the non-agricultural sector is: 
(∆VANA) / VANA = m * ∆VAagric / VANA   
                             = m * (∆VAagric / VAagric ) * VAagric / GDP) * (GDP / VANA ) 
                             = m * % ∆VAagric  * AgShareGDP / (Non-Ag Share GDP)   
                             = 2.5 * 3.9% * (0.232)/(1–0.232)  = 2.9% 
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These simple multiplier calculations do not exactly match the SAM-based SIO 
model results, since the fuller model does not treat all of agriculture as exogenous and the 
multipliers differ across sectors of the economy according to the input-output structure, 
shares of value-added received by various households, and household consumption 
patterns.  In particular, the changes in household incomes in the model are determined not 
only by the changes in value-added generated in various sectors but also by a household’s 
share in value-added earned by each factor of production.8 The simulations assume that 
unskilled labour markets are segmented into own-farm labour, agricultural wage labour, 
and non-agricultural unskilled labour markets.  Thus, in the simulations, most of the gains 
in total agricultural labour incomes accrue to farm households (reflecting the average 
distribution of agricultural labour incomes in the PRHS surveys).  If this pattern still 
holds for marginal increases in agricultural output in the future, increased agricultural 
output will result in relatively little increase in demand for landless agricultural labour.  
The simulations also assume that rural and urban markets for unskilled non-agricultural 
labour are integrated.  Thus the gains in non-agricultural unskilled labour incomes are 
split across both urban and rural households.9   
Finally, it should be noted that the simulations show the average gains in 
incomes for the various household groups.  If non-agricultural labour incomes are 
concentrated among only a segment of rural non-farm poor households, the 
percentage gains in income of this segment of households will be larger, (and the 
gains to other rural non-farm poor households correspondingly smaller).   
 
Simulation 2. Shift from Share-cropping to Fixed Rents 
In theory, productivity of share-croppers is expected to be lower than of 
owners or those with fixed-rent tenants, because for some inputs (such as own-
labour), share-croppers pay the full (implicit) cost but reap only a part (generally 
one-half) of the benefits in terms of value of output.  Using data from the HIES 
2001-02, Jacoby and Mansuri (2004) find no significant difference between 
productivity of share-croppers and owners for cultivation of major crops.  However, 
share-croppers who are not supervised (those who meet their landlords fewer than 
ten times in a season to discuss a given plot) are found to be 18 percent less 
productive than land-owners or share-croppers who are supervised.   
 
8The simple multiplier calculations in Table 5 do not provide direct estimates of changes in 
household incomes.  Nonetheless, the percentage changes in incomes of rural non-farm households in the 
SIO simulations are similar to the percentage changes in value-added in non-major crops in Table 5.   
9The PRHS data indicate that rural non-farm households have a lot of underemployed labour (per 
capita non-agricultural labour incomes are five times higher for rural non-farm non-poor households as 
compared with rural non-farm poor households).  In the SIO model analysis here, the average shares of 
labour income by household from the SAM are used to allocate marginal gains in labour incomes to 
households.  To the extent that rural non-farm poor households have higher marginal shares of the 
multiplier-effect gain in total labour incomes, the simulated income gains to rural non-farm poor 
households may be underestimated. 
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Simulation 2 models the effects of a 22 percent (=1/(1–.18)) increase in 
productivity for major crops as a result of a hypothetical shift from share-cropped to 
either fixed-rent or owned land.  Given that 18.8 percent of land in Pakistan is share-
cropped (Table 6), and of this, an estimated 35 percent of tenants are not supervised 
(based on the PRHS 2001-02 data), the effect on total production of major crops is 
only 1.4 percent.10 In the simulation, all the marginal increases in returns to land are 
allocated to share-croppers,11 according to their shares of total share-cropped land in 
the HIES 2001-02.12  Note that 39 percent and 27 percent of share-cropped area is 
farmed by only tenants in Sindh and Punjab, respectively (Table 7).  
 
Table 6 
Share of Household Group Area Cultivated by Tenure Status, 2001-02 
 Owned Fixed Rent Sharecrop Total 
Large Farm, Sindh 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Large Farm, Punjab 98.2 0.9 0.9 100.0 
Large Farm, Other Pakistan 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Medium Farm, Sindh 95.4 1.2 1.1 100.0 
Medium Farm, Punjab 85.8 8.4 1.9 100.0 
Medium Farm, Other Pakistan 97.2 2.8 0.0 100.0 
Small Farm, Sindh 87.6 1.1 10.4 100.0 
Small Farm, Punjab 69.6 20.4 9.1 100.0 
Small Farm, Other Pakistan 85.8 3.6 10.0 100.0 
Landless Farmers, Sindh 0.0 6.8 92.2 100.0 
Landless Farmers, Punjab 0.0 41.4 57.1 100.0 
Landless Farmers, Other Pakistan 0.0 28.7 70.9 100.0 
Urban Non-poor 81.5 14.1 4.0 100.0 
Urban Poor 44.9 21.8 33.3 100.0 
Total 67.1 13.4 18.1 100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HIES 2001-02 data. 
 
 
10(Productivity effect on unsupervised share-cropped land) *(unsupervised/total share-cropped 
land) *(share-cropped land/total land) = 0.22 * 0.35 * 0.188 = 1.4 percent. 
11In the case of a shift from share-cropping to fixed rents, this implicitly assumes that the fixed 
rent in rupee terms is set on the basis of the value of production less purchased inputs for the land when it 
was share-cropped.  Thus, the simulation models an upper-bound on the direct benefits to former share-
croppers of the productivity increase. 
12In the model simulations, this value-added is paid directly to households, bypassing the factor 
accounts. 
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Table 7 
Share of Area Cultivated, by Tenure Status and Household Group, 2001-02 
 Owned Fixed Rent Sharecrop Total 
Large Farm, Sindh 4.8 0.0 0.0 3.2 
Large Farm, Punjab 11.7 0.5 0.4 8.0 
Large Farm, Other Pakistan 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Medium Farm, Sindh 9.0 0.6 0.4 6.4 
Medium Farm, Punjab 21.1 10.4 1.7 16.5 
Medium Farm, Other Pakistan 3.6 0.5 0.0 2.5 
Small Farm, Sindh 5.8 0.4 2.6 4.5 
Small Farm, Punjab 30.7 45.2 14.8 29.6 
Small Farm, Other Pakistan 7.1 1.5 3.1 5.6 
Landless Farmers, Sindh 0.0 3.9 39.0 7.7 
Landless Farmers, Punjab 0.0 26.6 27.1 8.6 
Landless Farmers, Other Pakistan 0.0 4.9 8.9 2.3 
Urban Non-poor 5.2 4.5 1.0 4.3 
Urban Poor 0.4 1.0 1.1 0.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HIES 2001-02 data. 
 
Simulation results are given in Table 8.13  Though the gains on a national level 
are small, the impacts on tenants are significant.  Incomes of tenants in Sindh rise by 
4.0 percent; incomes of tenants in Punjab rise by 2.8 and 2.7 percent, respectively.  
However, even with a significant (and likely over-optimistic) value-added multiplier 
of 2.5, the initial shock is small relative to the size of the Pakistan economy, and the 
multiplier income gains are spread widely across household groups, so incomes of 
non-farm groups rise by only 0.3 percent at most.14    
 
13Note that in this simulation (and the ones that follow), we model a production shock instead of a 
simple value added shock, under the assumption that the productivity gain requires an increase in key 
inputs like labour and fertiliser. 
14Tenancy reform would likely increase growth multipliers by leading to an increase in demand 
for rural-based elastically supplied goods and a decrease in demand for inelastically-supplied goods.  
These differences in expenditure patterns of large/medium versus tenant farmers are incorporated in the 
analysis.  
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Table 8 











Large Farmers, Sindh 19.1 0.2 5.3 15.4 
Large Farmers, Punjab 64.1 0.2 5.0 10.7 
Large Farmers, Other Pak 10.8 0.2 3.1 7.6 
Med Farmers, Sindh 44.6 0.2 6.4 9.9 
Med Farmers, Punjab 146.0 0.3 5.6 8.4 
Med Farmers, Other Pak 35.6 0.3 5.8 9.0 
Sm Farmers, Sindh 57.6 0.4 3.9 6.1 
Sm Farmers, Punjab 318.9 0.4 4.4 6.6 
Sm Farmers, Other Pak 125.0 0.3 2.7 4.2 
Sm Farm Renters, Sindh 43.7 4.0 4.0 6.2 
Sm Farm Renters, Punjab 46.0 2.8 4.3 6.3 
Sm Farm Renters, Other Pak 15.0 2.7 2.8 4.4 
Agric. Workers, Sindh 20.8 0.2 2.2 3.3 
Agric. Workers, Punjab 68.2 0.2 2.4 3.6 
Agric. Workers, Other Pak 9.5 0.1 1.0 1.5 
Non-farm Non-poor 400.8 0.3 2.3 3.4 
Non-farm Poor 134.4 0.3 2.3 3.3 
Urban Non-poor 1744.0 0.2 1.1 1.7 
Urban Poor 181.4 0.3 2.4 3.5 
Source: Model Simulations. 
 
Simulation 3. Removal of Credit Constraints 
Using the PRHS 2001-02 data, Jacoby and Mansuri (2004a) show that farmers 
that are credit-rationed have lower productivity in crop production than do non-
rationed farmers.  Simulation 3 models a relaxation of the credit constraint for small 
farmers in Pakistan by increasing their crop output according to the econometric 
estimates of the productivity effects.   
Using the simplifying assumption that only small farmers are credit-
constrained, the magnitude of the productivity gain on total output of major crops is 
calculated using the estimated share of small farms that are credit-rationed.  In 
estimate 1, the 11.1 percent of farmers that are constrained in both formal and 
informal credit markets have 23 percent lower yields, suggesting that the total output 
of all small farmers would rise by 3.3 percent in the absence of credit constraints.  
Similarly, using the alternate estimate of a 26 percent decline in yields for farmers 
Dorosh, Niazi, and Nazli 264 
who are constrained in formal credit markets (45.7 percent of small farmers), output 
of small farmers would rise by 16.0 percent (Table 9).   
This 16 percent increase in small farm output (split across small farmers 
according to their shares in area of each crop as reflected in the SAM) results in 
moderate gains in average total incomes for small farmers: 3-4 percent for small 
farm owners and pure tenants in Sindh and Punjab. 
The increase in small farm output results in a bigger percentage gain in 
incomes for large farmers than small farmers in large part because land rents 
received account for a large share of income of large and (especially) medium 
farmers (Table 8).  For example, returns to land on small farms (mainly land rents) 
account for 23 percent of income for medium land-owners in Sindh, while returns to 
land on small farms account for only 12 percent of incomes of owners (and owner-
cum-tenants) of small farms. 
 
Table 9 
Estimates of Productivity Gains from Removal of Credit Constraints 






 (1) Share of farm households that are credit-rationed 0.1 0.41 
 (2) Number of small owner and owner-cum-tenant farms as % of total farms 66.6% 66.6% 
 (3) Number of pure tenant farms as % of total farms 23.1% 23.1% 
 (4) Number of small farms (all types) as % of total farms, (2)+(3) 89.8% 89.8% 
 (5) Percentage of small farms that are credit-rationed, (1)/(4) 11.1% 45.7% 
 (6) Impact of credit rationing on productivity (regression results) –0.23 –0.26 
 (7) Output gain from relaxing credit constraint, [1/(1+(6)] –1 29.9% 35.1% 
 (8) Percentage gain in output of small farmers from relaxing credit constraint, (5)*(7) 3.3% 16.0% 
 (9) Share of small farmers in total land value-added (major crops) 53.8% 53.8% 
(10) % increase in total value-added (major crops) 1.8% 8.6% 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Pakistan SAM 2001-02, and Jacoby and Mansuri (2004a).  
 
Simulation 4. Improved Distribution of Water  
Excess use of water by farmers at the head of canals and water supply 
shortages in the canal itself result in lower productivity for farmers at the tail-end of 
canals.  Simulation 4 models the effects on productivity and incomes of easing the 
water constraint by providing more water to farm plots at the tail-end of canals.  This 
gain in supply of water to tail-end farmers could be achieved through better water 
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distribution or increased availability of water achieved through measures such as 
canal lining.  In the simulation, this increase in water at the tail-end is assumed to 
have no effect on productivity of farmers at the head-end, however.   
Detailed data on the share of land affected by water shortages at the tail-end 
of canals is unavailable, but limited survey evidence [Hussain (2003)] suggests that 
approximately 27 percent of farmers are located at the tail-end of canal systems.  In 
the simulation, productivity of crop production at the tail-end is increased by 30 to 
90 percent, based on the productivity differentials between head and tail farms 
reported in Table 10.15  Tail-end land is assumed to be distributed by farm size in the 
same proportions as the average distribution of small farmland in each region (Sindh, 
Punjab, Other Pakistan), Table 11.   
As shown in Table 8, large farmers enjoy the largest percentage increase in 
incomes as a result of this productivity gain, with incomes of large and medium 
farmers in Sindh rising by 15.0 and 9.9 percent, respectively.  Incomes of large and 
medium farmers in Punjab rise by 10.7 and 8.4 percent, respectively.  Small farm 
owners and pure tenants in these two provinces benefit as well, as their incomes rise 
by 6.1 to 6.6 percent.  This distribution of benefits broadly reflects the shares of 
returns to irrigated land. 
However, in spite of the significant (and perhaps over-optimistic) gains in 
output modelled here, incomes of agricultural workers in the two provinces rise by 
only 3.3–3.6 percent, and incomes of the non-farm rural poor rise by only 3.3 
percent.  Thus, in spite of a 14 percent increase in the value of production of major 
crops and large GDP multipliers, the gains to the poorest rural household groups 
(agricultural workers and non-farm rural poor) are relatively small. 
 
Table 10 
Crop Yields by Location along Canals (Tons/Hectare) 
 Head Tail 
Ratio 
Head/Tail 
Wheat 2.4 1.7 1.4 
IRRI Rice 2.9 1.9 1.5 
Basmati Rice 2.2 1.7 1.3 
Sugarcane 54.7 29 1.9 
Source: National Agricultural Commission Report (1987), p. 289. 
 
 
15Cotton  production of tail-end farmers is increased by 50 percent (the arithmetic average of the 
productivity differentials in Table 11).   
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Table 11 
Distribution of Estimated Returns to Small Farm Irrigated Land 
(Major Crops), 2001-02 
Returns to Land on Small Farms (<12.5 Acres) 
 
(Bn Rs) % of Total % of Total HH 
Revenues 
Large Farmer, Sindh  1,310 1.1% 6.9% 
Large Farmer, Punjab  4,849 4.0% 7.6% 
Large Farmer, Other Pak.  845 0.7% 7.9% 
Med. Farmer, Sindh  10,067 8.4% 22.6% 
Med. Farmer, Punjab  25,602 21.4% 17.5% 
Med. Farmer, Other Pak.  8,466 7.1% 23.8% 
Small Farmer, Sindh  7,103 5.9% 12.3% 
Small Farmer, Punjab  41,746 34.8% 13.1% 
Small Farmer, Other Pak.  9,676 8.1% 7.7% 
Landless Farmer, Sindh  4,099 3.4% 9.4% 
Landless Farmer, Punjab  4,774 4.0% 10.4% 
Landless Farmer, Other Pak.  1,365 1.1% 9.1% 
All Farmers  119,902 100.0% 12.9% 
Large Farmers  7,004 5.8% 7.5% 
Medium Farmers  44,134 36.8% 19.5% 
Small Farmers  58,525 48.8% 11.7% 
Landless Farmers  10,238 8.5% 9.8% 
All Farmers  119,902 100.0% 12.9% 
Source:  Pakistan SAM 2001-02. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Two broad conclusions emerge. First, the level and distribution of the benefits of 
removal of factor market distortions depend crucially on the magnitude of the induced 
productivity shock and the ownership of the assets involved.  In spite of multiplier 
effects, reforms related to share-cropping are likely to have only small overall impacts on 
rural incomes in aggregate in the short run, though the benefits to tenants could be 
significant. Credit market reforms and improvements in water availability have 
potentially larger effects on the overall rural economy. (See Appendix Table 2.1.)   
Second, although the expansion of traditional crop agriculture can 
significantly benefit rural poor farmers, yet the linkage effects with the rural non-
farm economy may not be adequate to substantially raise incomes of agricultural 
labourers and the rural non-farm poor who lack significant capital resources and who 
together account for 61 percent of the rural poor (and nearly 30 percent of the rural 
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population).  Model simulations suggest that a 3.9 percent rate of growth in real 
agricultural output (the average rate of growth in real agricultural GDP from 1975 to 
1990), in the absence of reduced real prices of staple foods, would raise rural non-
farm income growth by only about 2.9 percent per year, implying a per capita 
income growth of less than 1.0 percent per year.   
Because of data uncertainties and simplifying assumptions used, the above 
analysis of the effects of increases in agricultural output illustrates only the broad order 
of magnitude of the effects.  More work is needed both to improve the database and the 
modelling approach.  Of particular importance is data on the detailed structure of rural  
non-farm output and income—about what is produced and which household groups 
buy the products and services.  Further refinements in the SAM could also be made 
using an updated input-output table (when available), greater disaggregation of service 
activities, and more detailed specification of urban households.  Continued efforts are 
needed, as well, in household survey design and construction of national accounts to 
achieve more consistency between national consumption and income estimates from 
these two sources.  Finally, model simulations with a general equilibrium model could 
incorporate wage and price effects.16        
Nonetheless, the broad structure of rural production, distribution of land and 
other factors of production, and structure of household incomes are reflected in the 
analysis.  In particular, the analysis captures the major implications of the skewed 
distribution of ownership of land and the dependence of much of the poor on non-
agricultural income sources.  Because of this distribution of assets and the sources of 
income, the direct and indirect effects of growth in the traditional crop sector (though 
substantial) are unlikely to significantly reduce poverty among landless agricultural 
labourers and the rural non-farm poor.   
Agricultural growth and associated growth linkages to the rural non-farm 
economy still remain very important for reducing rural poverty. Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that slow rates of growth of the agricultural sector would 
likely result in stagnant or increased rural poverty in Pakistan.  But while robust 
agricultural growth may be a necessary condition for rapid rural poverty 
reduction, the analysis suggests that it is not a sufficient condition.  In the 
absence of a change in the structure of rural incomes and employment, further 
measures will likely be needed for rapid poverty reduction in Pakistan, including 
greater efforts to boost the livestock sector, expansion of the rural non-farm 
economy (in addition to agricultural growth-induced linkage effects), and 
targeted interventions to the poorest rural households.  
 
16Comparative analysis of growth linkage effects using the SIO multiplier models and the CGE 
models for sub-Saharan African countries shows that the linkage effects of agricultural growth are 
somewhat overstated in the SIO multiplier analysis, suggesting that these modelling refinements would 
strengthen the conclusions of this paper regarding the limitations of agricultural growth as a means of 
raising incomes of rural non-farm households in Pakistan [Dorosh and Haggblade (2003)]. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The 2001-02 Pakistan SAM 
The data base for the analysis presented in this paper is a 2001-02 social 
accounting matrix (SAM), a consistent set of accounts of the economic flows 
between production activities, earnings of factors of production, incomes of various 
types of households, and demand for goods and services. 
The 2001-02 Pakistan SAM includes 34 activities, each producing a single 
commodity, except for irrigated wheat and non-irrigated wheat, both of which 
produce a single commodity (wheat) (Box A3.1). For the twelve agricultural 
activities, returns to land and own-family labour are disaggregated by region 
(Punjab, Sindh, and Other Pakistan) and by size of farm (small (0–12.5 acres), 
medium (12.5–50 acres) and large (50 acres plus) farms (defined according to 
operated area, not land-ownership).  Out of the 27 factors of production that are 
specified, 23 involve only agricultural production: 8 types of agricultural labour, 12 
types of land, and 3 other factors: water, livestock capital, and other agricultural 
capital.    
This detailed treatment of rural factors and agriculture in the SAM reflects the 
primary objective of constructing the SAM: to better understand the relationship 
between agricultural performance and rural income growth in the context of 
imperfect rural factor markets.  Fifteen of the nineteen household categories are rural 
agricultural households, split according to amount of land cultivated (large farm, 
small farm, landless) and region (Sindh, Punjab, and Other Pakistan). Non-farm 
households, both rural and urban, are split into poor and non-poor according to their 
2000-01 per capita household expenditures, with poor households defined as those 
with a per capita expenditure of less than 748 rupees/month per capita.  By this 
definition, 23.5 percent of the rural population (19.8 percent of total population) are 
classified as non-farm rural poor households,17 and 22.7 percent of urban households 
(15.3 percent of the total national population) are poor.   
Data used in construction of the SAM derive mainly from the 1990-91 Input-
Output Table (97 sectors), 2001-02 National Accounts (value-added for 15 sectors), 
2001-02 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (consumption disaggregation), the 
2001 Pakistan Rural Household Survey (household income disaggregation), and the 
2001-02 Pakistan Economic Survey (sector/commodity data on production, prices, 
trade).18  
 
17Non-farm rural households are defined as rural households for which the main occupation of the 
head of household is not crop or livestock farming. 
18See Dorosh, Niazi, and Nazli (2004) “A Social Accounting Matrix for Pakistan, 2001-02: 
Methodology and Results” for details of the construction of the SAM.    
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Household incomes and expenditures relative to those of other household 
groups follow similar patterns as in the PRHS and the HIES surveys, though absolute 
levels of household incomes and expenditures are substantially higher, given the 
apparent substantial under-reporting of expenditures (particularly on services) and 
informal sector incomes in the surveys.   
On average, household incomes in the SAM are 2.1 times greater than 
household expenditures in the HIES Survey, and rural household incomes in the 
SAM are 1.7 times greater than rural household incomes in the PRHS survey 
(Appendix Table 1.1).  These ratios vary by household group, however.  The SAM 
calculations suggest that expenditures of large and medium farmers are seriously 
understated in the HIES—by a factor of 3.8, on average.  Compared to total incomes 
in the PRHS survey results, however, factor incomes of medium and large farmers in 
the SAM are only 2.8 times higher.  Note that much of the difference in incomes is 
due to estimated returns to cultivated land.  For only two household groups, rural 
non-farm poor and rural agricultural labour in Sindh, are the SAM household 
incomes less than household expenditures in the HIES.19  
Agricultural factor incomes account for only 23 percent of total factor 
incomes in Pakistan; but 60 percent of total factor incomes for agricultural 
households (77 percent for agricultural households in Sindh) (Appendix Table 1.2).  
Ninety-one percent of agricultural incomes derive from land, water, own-farm 
labour, or livestock, so that without access to land or livestock, earnings from hired 
labour, and (non-livestock) agricultural capital account for only 9 percent of 
agricultural incomes.   
Land accounts for more than 30 percent of household incomes, only for 
medium and large farm owners (Appendix Table 1.3).  Agricultural labour accounts 
for 32 percent of incomes for agricultural wage labourer households, but only 9 
percent of incomes of tenants and 4 percent of incomes of small farmers.  Overall, 
agricultural incomes account for an average of 56 percent of estimated incomes of 
agricultural households in the SAM, compared with 75 percent in the PRHS 
(Appendix Table 1.4).  As described above, the higher figures in the SAM arise 
mainly because of allocation of income from non-agricultural labour and informal 
capital to rural households. 
 
 
19Note that because of a lack of reliable data, the SAM does not contain household transfers 
received from other households.  Including transfer income would likely bring the SAM household per 
capita income estimates for these groups to approximately the same level as the HIES household per 
capita expenditure estimates. 






Structure of the 2001-02 Pakistan SAM 
 
Activities (34)  
Agriculture (12): Wheat irrigated*, Wheat non-irrigated*, Rice-IRRI*, Rice-
basmati*, Cotton*, Sugarcane*, Other major crops, Fruits and vegetables, Livestock-
cattle/dairy*, Poultry, Forestry, Fishing. 
Industry (16): Mining*, Vegetable oils*, Wheat milling*, Rice milling-
IRRI*, Rice milling-basmati*, Sugar*, Other food, Cotton lint/yarn*, Textiles*, 
Leather*, Wood products, Chemicals*, Cement/bricks Petroleum refining*, Other 
manufacturing*, Energy*.  
Services (6): Construction, Commerce, Transport, Housing, Private Services, 
Public services. 
 
Commodities (33)  
The same as activities with Wheat irrigated and Wheat non-irrigated aggregated as 
one commodity (Wheat). 
 
Factors (27) 
Labour (10): Own-farm (Large farm, Medium farm Sindh, Medium farm Punjab, 
Medium farm Other Pakistan, Small farm Sindh, Small farm Punjab, Small farm 
Other Pakistan), Agricultural wage, Non-agricultural unskilled, skilled.  
Land (12): Large farm (Sindh, Punjab, Other Pakistan), Irrigated medium farm 
(Sindh, Punjab, Other Pakistan), Irrigated small farm (Sindh, Punjab, Other Pakistan), 
Non-irrigated small farm (Sindh, Punjab, Other Pakistan). 
Other Factors (5): Water, Capital livestock, Capital other-agriculture, Capital 
formal, Capital informal. 
 
Households (19) 
Rural (17): Large farm (Sindh, Punjab, Other Pakistan), Medium farm (Sindh, 
Punjab, Other Pakistan), Small farm (Sindh, Punjab, Other Pakistan), Landless 
farmer (Sindh, Punjab, Other Pakistan), Rural agricultural landless (Sindh, Punjab, 
Other Pakistan), Rural non-farm non-poor, Rural non-farm poor. 
Urban (2): non-poor, poor. 
 
Other Institutional Accounts (4): Enterprises, Government, Rest of world, Capital. 
 
* denotes the 20 inelastically-supplied sectors in the SAM multiplier analysis. 
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Appendix Table 1.2 



















 Labour  0.522 0.298 0.248 0.240 0.190 0.232 
 Land  0.081 0.144 0.242 0.220 0.190 0.218 
 Water  0.003 0.005 0.014 0.009 – 0.008 
 Capital  0.394 0.553 0.497 0.531 0.620 0.542 
    of which Livestk &Ag Capital  0.115 0.205 0.408 0.249 0.379 0.302 
  Total  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 Own-farm & Agric. / Total Inc.  0.231 0.411 0.766 0.560 0.652 0.615 
 Own-farm / Agric. Income  0.906 0.906 0.890 0.896 0.949 0.905 
Source: Pakistan SAM 2001-02. 
 
Appendix Table 1.3 















Large Farm Owners (50+ acres) 0.34 0.36 0.00 0.70 0.15 0.10 0.05 1.00 
Medium Farm Owners (12.5-50) 0.31 0.21 0.00 0.52 0.27 0.16 0.05 1.00 
Small Farm Owners (<12.5 acres) 0.18 0.32 0.04 0.55 0.23 0.16 0.06 1.00 
Pure Tenants 0.16 0.35 0.09 0.60 0.15 0.20 0.06 1.00 
Agricultural Labourers 0.00 0.21 0.32 0.53 0.27 0.14 0.06 1.00 
Rural Non-farm Non-poor 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.43 0.07 1.00 
Rural Non-farm Poor 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.59 0.30 0.07 1.00 
Urban Non-poor 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.45 0.44 1.00 
Urban Poor 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.76 0.06 1.00 
Rural Sub-total 0.13 0.20 0.04 0.37 0.33 0.24 0.06 1.00 
  Rural Non-agric Households 0.21 0.29 0.06 0.56 0.23 0.16 0.06 1.00 
Urban Sub-total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.48 0.41 1.00 
All Pakistan 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.21 0.37 0.25 1.00 
Source: Pakistan SAM 2001-02. 
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Appendix Table 1.4 


















Medium and Large Farms 15.7 83.5 29.9 57.2 
Small Farms 6.1 67.9 8.6 54.8 
Landless Farmers 7.2 87.7 5.3 59.7 
Rural Agric. Workers 2.2 53.1 5.5 53.1 
Rural Non-farm Non-poor 0.3 1.9 0.1 0.4 
Rural Non-farm Poor 0.2 6.3 0.2 4.5 
Total Rural 6.1 69.7 5.6 37.2 
Rural Agric. Households 7.1 74.8 9.6 55.9 
Source:  Pakistan SAM 2001-02; Pakistan Rural Household Survey 2001-02.   
 
Appendix Table 2.1 










Large/Medium Farmers  320 0.25 5.51 9.52 
Small Farm Owners  502 0.41 3.95 5.91 
Small Farm Renters  105 3.29 3.93 5.97 
Agricultural Workers  98 0.20 2.24 3.34 
Non-farm Non-poor  401 0.33 2.35 3.43 
Non-farm Poor  134 0.31 2.26 3.31 
Urban Non-poor  1744 0.16 1.15 1.68 
Urban Poor  181 0.33 2.40 3.47 
Total  3485 0.33 2.31 3.54 
Shares of Total Income Gains (percent)   
Large/Medium Farmers 9.2 6.9 21.9 24.7 
Small Farm Owners 14.4 17.5 24.6 24.0 
Small Farm Renters 3.0 29.5 5.1 5.1 
Agricultural Workers 2.8 1.7 2.7 2.7 
Non-farm Non-poor 11.5 11.2 11.7 11.1 
Non-farm Poor 3.9 3.6 3.8 3.6 
Urban Non-poor 50.0 24.5 24.8 23.7 
Urban Poor 5.2 5.1 5.4 5.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Model simulations. 
                  a In billion rupees. 
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